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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County declaring the operation and effect of 
sections of the Utah Liquor Control Act, Title 46, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943. 
Action was commenced by the Attorney General for the 
State of Utah to determine whether certain conduct of the 
defendants was in violation of Sections 46-0-157a, 46-0-168 
and 46-0-23 7 Utah Code Annotated 1943. Because appellant 
is in agreement with the ruling of the District Court as to 
Section 46-0-15 7a, no issue is being taken in that regard in 
this appeal, and plaintiff likewise does not contend that the 
operations. of the defendants· are. in contravention of Section . 
46-0-168. It is the construction of Section 46-0-23 7 by the 
trial court which is the basis of this appeal. 
There is no substantial- fact issue between plaintiff and 
defendants, the case having been submitted upon stipulations 
between the parties. 
. The facts as stipulated, and a~ found by the triaJ court, 
show the follovving: 
The defendants are 11 nonprofit corporations of th~ State 
of Utah, and in their corporate capacity occupy buildings or 
portions of buildings. All. of these corporations are bona fide 
clubs and the State does not conteng that any of them was 
organized for the purpose of evading the· Utah Liquor Control 
Act. 
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Not\\·ithstanding the high purposes of the clubs, and the 
honorable tnotives of their n1en1bers, each of the defendants 
maintains what is known as a liquor ulocker system" whereby 
lockers of varying sizes are let to members of the clubs (Tr. 
109, 11·-L 12 0, 12 2, 12 .1, 12 9, 13 _1, 13 7, 1-11 , 14 2 d) . The 
ttlessees,, may, if they desire, store in these lockers alcoholic 
beverages purchased from the Utah Liquor Control Cotn-
mission. Some of the defendants allow only the holder of 
the locker to have a key, others retain a master key by \vhich 
officials or certain employees may open any locker. 
In addition to the lockers mentioned, each defendant 
maintains a room or rooms-which may or may not be separate 
from the locker room-in which members (and in the case 
of some of the clubs, guests) may convert the liquor and 
other ingredients into a finished mixed drink. To this end the 
defendant clubs supply ice, glasses and various types of mixers 
-either for cash or a signature on a slip. The clubs will, 
however, furnish ice, mixers and soft drinks to liquorless 
patrons without a price differential. In some of the clubs only 
the ingredients are supplied; in others, members may by paying 
a small service charge have an attendant do the mixing. The 
plaintiff ·does not, for the purposes of this appeal, regard 
these differences in practice as being n1aterial. 
As an aid to the-construction of the Liquor Control Act 
the State introduced a certified copy of the enrolled House Bill 
41 of the 1935 State Legislature (Ex. nA"). The defendants 
put in evidence some opinions issued by the office of Attorney 
General ~f Utah, and data regarding the number of beer 
licenses issued in Salt Lake City. In open court it \vas stipu-
5 
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lated that the locker system has been in existence in Utah 
in some form or other lC since before the repeal ·of prohibition" 
(R. 166). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court improperly ruled that the operations 
and methods of the defendants are not con-
trary to the provisions of 46-0-23 7 Utah Code 
Annotated 1943. 
(a) Section 46-0-23 7 Utah Code Annotated 
1943, by its terms makes an offense of 
maintaining an establishment where per-
sons are permitted to resort for the drink-
ing of alcoholic beverages. 
(b) The plain meaning of a statute may not 
be varied by contemporaneous construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY RULED THAT THE 
OPERATIONS AND METHODS OF THE DEFENDANTS 
ARE NOT CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF 46-0-237 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943. 
(A) SECTION 46-0-237 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1943 BY ITS TERMS MAKES AN OFFENSE OF MAIN-
TAINING AN ESTABLISHMENT WHERE PERSONS ARE 
PERMITTED TO RESORT FOR THE DRINKING OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that Section 46-0-25 7 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 shows a legislative intent to make 
a common nuisance of any establishment where a number of 
persons are frequently permitted to gather and consume alco-
holic beverages, \vhether or not these persons violate other 
provisions of the Liquor Control Act. The section in question 
provides: 
tt.~:"\ny room, house, building, boat~ vehicle, structure 
or place where alcoholic beverages are n1anufactured, 
sold, kept, bartered, stored or given a\vay, or used in 
violation of this act, or U'here persons 1'esort for the 
drinking o.f alcoholic bet·erages} and all alcoholic bever-
ages, packages, equipment or other property kept or 
used in maintaining the same, are hereby declared to 
be con1mon nuisances; * * * '' (Italics added). 
It is also provided that persons who maintain such common 
nuisances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Under 46-0-2~!8 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, common nuisances of the preceding 
section may be abated by court proceedings. 
It is not disputed that the defendants maintain rooms or 
buildings wherein persons are permitted to n1eet and drink 
alcoholic beverages. But it is contended, on the other hand, 
that this practice does not amount to ((resorting'' as that term 
is used in the statute, and that the statute was not meant to 
prohibit drinking in «private clubs." 
A glance at the history of the legislation will give us an 
· idea of what the legislature had in mind when it adopted the 
present wording. Th~ Liquor Control Act originally appeared 
I 
as Chapter 43, Laws of Utah 1935. At that time 46-0-23 7 
was Section 195. It then read: 
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(l * * * or where persons resort for the drinking 
of alcoholic beverages contrary to the provisions of this 
act, * * * are hereby declared to be common nuisances." 
(Italics. added.) 
As the section then stood it was arguable, if not clear, that 
under its terms something more than a mere ''resorting" was 
needed to make an establishment a common nuisance. The 
resorting would have to have been in violation of some other 
.positive provision of law. 
The act was amended in some details in 193 7. At that 
time the legislature deleted the words •tcontrary to the pro-
visions of this act," and left the section in the form in which 
it now appears in the code. If the legislautre in 193 7 had 
been seeking a way of making a substantive offense of the 
mere maintaining of a place where persons resort for the drink-
ing of alcoholic beverages, it is difficult to comprehend a 
simpler way of doing this than the method adopted. 
Certainly some effect must be . given to the change 1n 
wording. It is a well-established principle of statutory con-
struction that where the legislature changes the wording of a 
statute it thereby intends to change the law. 
The general rule relating to the effect of amendment 
of an existing statute is found in Sutherland on Statutory 
. Construction ( 3rd Ed.) Sec. 1930; 
t 'Because it is defined as an act that changes an 
existing statute, the courts have declared that the mere 
fact that the legislature enacts an amendment indicates 
that it thereby intended to change the original act by 
creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. 
Therefore, any material change in the language of the 
.8 
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original act is presun1ed to indicate a change in legal 
rights." 
In In re Segregation of School District No. 58 fron1 Rural 
High School District No. 1, 34 Idaho 222, 200 Pac. 138, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho says: 
ttAn intentional on1ission of \Yards by a legislature 
should be given effect (citing cases). Where changes 
haYe been introduced by amendment, it is not to be 
assumed that they were without design; usually an 
intent to change the law is inferred. Springfield Co. 
v. Walton, 95 ~1o. App. 526, 69 S. W. 477; Duff v. 
Karr, 91 :Nio. App. 16. However, every change of 
phraseology does not indicate a change of substance 
and intent. * * * A change of language has more 
significance "\\'here the purpose is to amend a single 
statute than in a general revision or codification.'' 
The amendment in the instant case did not con1e in during a 
general revision of the code. See also Yarbrough v. Collins, 
91 Tex. 406, 42 S. W. 1052; Rieger v. Harrington, 102 Or. 
603, 613; 203 Pac. 576, 580; Pierce v. Riley, 21 Cal. App. (2d) 
513; 70 Pac. (2d) 206. 
It is not unreasonable to seek to prevent such resorting. As 
an aid to law enforcement the legislature may prohibit many 
things which are not in themselves bad. During prohibition, 
\vhen the sale of intoxicating beverages was unlawful, many 
states also prohibited the sale of certain similar non-intoxicants 
for the reason that such sales might enable persons to evade 
the provisions relating to intoxicants. In a situation \vhere. the 
state is given the power to make all sales of intoxicating lic.1uors 
it is. legitin1ate-and possibly \vise-for the legislature to 
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prevent the maintaining of establishments· which could become 
a shield for the sale of intoxicating liquors contrary to law. 
The history of intoxicating liquors is a history of legisla-
tive attempts to devise the most effective means of control. 
There has been legislation on the subject in England since the 
early days of the common law, and in America since colonial 
days. See 7 Law and Contemporary Problems 544. It is not 
startling, therefore, to assume that the legislature of Utah, 
in seeking a means of liquor law enforcement, looked to the 
past and to prior statutes. Our provision relating to ((resort-
ing" is not a child of the imagination of the Utah legislature. 
·The cases show that substantially similar provisions have been 
used by various ·states. 
In State v. Owens et al., 9 Kan. App. 595, 58 Pac. 240, 
the defendants had been convicted of keeping a place where 
persons were permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking 
intoxicating liquors as a beverage. On appeal the defendants 
contended, inter alia, that the act should be interpreted to 
operate upon places where persons resort <(in violation of law." 
On this question the Kansas ·court said: 
<(But the offense charged is not the possession of the 
liquors, nor the giving a\vay of liquors, but the keeping 
of a place where persons were permitted to resort for 
the purpose of drinking intoxicating liquors as a bev-
erage. The keeping of such a place constitutes the 
gravamen of the offense, and in this connection we 
may remark that the giving by a person of a drink of 
intoxicating liquor to a friend upon such person's own 
premises would not, as is contended by appellant's 
counsel, constitute a violation of the nuisance section 
of· the prohibitory law, even though the clause under 
10 
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consideration be construed in its literal sense. The 
\vord (resort' n1eans sotnething of a con1n1on occur-
rence,-the habitual frequenting of a place by more 
than one person. * * * 
l'hat part of the prohibitory liquor Lt\\' '"hich de-
fines (common nuisances' is as follo\vs: tAll places 
\vhere intoxicating liquors are n1anufactured, sold, 
L' ..l 
bartered or given a\\·a~· in violation of any of the 
provisions of this act, or where persons are permitted 
to resort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating 
liquors as a beverage, or '"here intoxicating liquors 
are kept_ for sale, barter, or delivery in violation of 
this act, are hereby declared to be common nuisances.' 
* * * To construe the second clause as appellant's 
counsel would have us would be, in effect, to hold it 
a mere repetition of the first and third clauses. As the 
legislature otnitted the qualifying words, (in violation 
of the provisions of this act,' from the ·second clause, 
we are led to the conclusion that it \Vas the intention 
of the legislature to make the ckeeping' of a place to 
which persons habitually resort for the purpose of 
drinking liquor as a beverage a crime, whether any 
other provision of the prohibitory law was violated at 
such place or not." 
In the above case the court was dealing v1ith an original, 
unamended statute. Where the statute has been amended, 
as in the present case, and the words {(contrary to the provisions 
of this act" eliminated by subsequent action of the legislature, 
the argument that there must be an additional violation loses 
all force. 
In Shelton v. State, 191 Ind. 228, 132 N.W. 594, the 
court \Vas called upon to construe a section of the Indiana la\v 
which made a place a common nuisance if persons were 
11 
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permitted to resort there for the purpose of drinking intoxi-
cating liquors. On affirming the conviction, it was said: 
((Proof that she maintained a place where persons 
were permitted to resort for the purpose of drinking 
intoxicating liquor as a beverage was sufficient to 
sustain a verdict of guilty." 
In State v. Poggmeyer, 91 Kan. 633, 138 Pac. 593, a con-
viction for maintaining a common nuisance was sustained 
where the evidence showed that meetings pad been held in 
a rented room every two weeks for thirteen weeks and that 
beer had been served at four of the meetings. 
In State v. Topeka Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 722, the Kansas Supren1e Court, in discussing 
the "resorting'' and related provisions of Kansas law, said: 
n'The main and principal object of this statute does 
not seem to be merely to prevent people from drinking 
their own liquor as a beverage, but its real purpose 
is to prevent the organization . of associations for the 
purpose of maintaining a place where a large number 
of people are ·permitted to l<eep intoxicating liquor 
and use it as a beverage." 
It is admitted that the above cases are not of recent vintage. 
They were in the reports at the time the Utah Liquor Control 
Act was originally passed. They were still_in the reports \vhen 
the act was amended in 1937. We must assume that when 
the legislature adopted the present statute it meant also to 
adopt interpretations of the language used. 
In In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 138, 158 Pac. 
705, this court recognized such a rule of construction \vhen 
. ' 
it said: 
12 
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nln vie\V that the decisions of Iowa were in effect 
before that section was adopted by the code comtnis-
sion of this state in 1898, we must assume that the 
construction placed upon it by the Supreme Court of 
Jo,va '''as likewise adopted.'' 
The rule thus announced has been generally follo\ved in this 
state. See In re Co\van' s Estate, 98 Utah 393, 396, 99 Pac. 
(2d) 605; Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 
177; 97 Pac. (2d) 937, 126 A.L.R. 1~~18; Fuller-Toponce Truck 
Co. v. Public Service C~mmission, 99 Utah 28, 35; 96 Pac. (2d) 
722. When the present Hresorting" provision was adopted in 
Utah the meaning of nresorting" under similar acts \vas firmly 
established. 
The construction contended for by appellant would not 
require a holding that all licensed beer vendors are also guilty 
of maintaining common nuisances, even though beer does come 
within the defihition of ( (alcoholic beverage'' under the Utah 
, 
act. The. reason is pointed out in Sopher v. State, 169 Ind. 
177, 81 N.E. 91:, 14 Ann. Cas. 27, 14 L.R.A. (N.S. )- 172. 
This case points out that while such sales might be nuisances 
under a general section, . the fact that they are licensed by 
authority of the state removes them from the general operation 
of the prohibitory section. In holding that evidence of a 
license should have been received in this prosecution for main-
taining a nuisance, the Indiana court said: 
((A publ~c nuisance, strictly speaking, arises out of 
the violation of public rights, and as a general rule 
results in no more special injury to one person than to 
another. Such nuisance always arises from unlawful 
acts. Consequently that which is lawful cannot be 
regarded in a legal sense as a public nuisance.· 
13 
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Therefore, if the Legislature, by a statute which it 
is competent for that body to pass, authorizes an act 
or acts to be done, which in the absence of such a 
statute, would otherwise constitute a public nuisance, 
such act or acts, are thereby made lawful, and cannot 
be considered or regarded in a legal sense as a nuisance 
so far as the public is concerned, unless the Legislature 
in enacting the statute has exceeded its power." 
Defendants' pleadings and the findings of fact make much 
of the circumstance ( \vhich we acknowledge) that the clubs 
are of ·an outstanding character and composeq of high-class 
members. A similar contention was made in State v. Topeka 
Club, 82 Kan. 756, 109 Pac. 183, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 722. The 
court said: 
('The legislature doubtless believed that, if persons 
were permitted to maintain club rooms in which liquor 
was kept for use as a beverage, the practice, however 
innocent in itself, v.rhen carried. on. in good faith, 
might easily be converted into a medium for the sale 
of liquor under the form of maintaining a club, and .to 
. prevent this practice for~ade a course of conduct where 
sales, if made, would be difficult to detect and punish. 
* * * 
We conclude that the chief purpose of this section 
was to prevent a practice which might encourag~ and 
perhaps lead to sales of intoxicating liquors at such 
places. It is therefore fairly within the scope of the 
title to the act, and is not unconstitutional. It may 
be said of the club that on account of the careful 
manner in v;hich it has been managed no serious ob-
jections have been urged against it, but under the. rules 
and regulations v.rhich it has adopted, an association of 
men inclined to violate the law and trespass upon the 
peace and· good order of society might become a very 
unsatisfactory and objectionable institution.'' 
14 
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Con1menting upon the fact that only 15 of the 140 tnembers 
actually used the locker system of the club, the court said, 
ttthis * * * is due to the character of the n1embership rather 
than to the character of the organization." 
And in Harvey v. 1t1issouri Athletic Club, 261 Ivlo. 576, 
170 S.\X'. 904, L.R . .:\. 1915 C 876, 5 A.L.R. 1192, the court 
con1mented upon the dispensing of liquors as being "iqci-
dental" to the main purposes of social clubs incorporated under 
a statute providing for the formation of benevolent, religious: 
scientific and educational associations, by saying: 
''to render respondents' contention applicable it must 
be further assumed that the sale of liquors, concretely 
stated, is related to either benevolence, religion, science, 
or education,- or that it is incident to one of such ob-
jects,-. a rather unusual relationship, to say the least." 
While the present case does not involve the ((sale" of liquors, 
the principle involved is the same. 
The court below admitted an incapacity to draw the line 
between what conduct would amount to resorting and what 
\vould not. It placed upon the appellant t_he burden. of dis-
tinguishing bet\veen those cases where the statute would in 
every instance apply and those in which it ':'ould not. Inasmuch 
as the appellant was not able to do this to the satisfaction 
of the trial court, that court ruled, in effect, that there are no 
situations in which the statute applies. We submit that it 
is not necessary to the decision of this case to delineate with 
fine precision the results of all possible cases where the question 
n1ight again arise. The only point to be determined in this 
action is \':hether the defendant clubs are violating the section 
15 
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tn 1ssue. It was not necessary for the trial court, nor for this 
court, to detennine whether the prohibitory· words of 46-0-23 7 
would apply to homes or to the use of sacramental wine.s in 
churches. We have before us a case where the statute clearly 
applies. The trial court used the .. backward approach" to 
statutory construction and found that inasmuch as there might 
be some cases in which the statute would be of doubtful mean-
ing it is doubtful as applied to all situations. The method 
adopted below was to use statutory construction in order to 
create, rather than to solve, an ambiguity. The court belo\v 
was obligated only to ru'le whether the present defendants 
were within or without the statute; it was not required to draw 
a sharp line which would resolve, in advance, all possible future 
litigation which might arise under 46-0-23 7. 
(B) THE P~AIN MEANING OF A STATUTE MAY 
NOT BE VARIED BY CONTEMPORANEOlJS CON-
STRUCTION. 
The defendants have relied upon the doctrine of con-
tempor_aneous construction because of the fact that they have 
operated. in their present manner for a number of years. The 
oral stipulation, as pointed out in the statement of facts, was 
to the effect that the locker system has been used in Utah since 
before the repeal of prohibition. It is plaintiff's belief that 
under such circumstances it cannot be contended that the users 
of the locker system had n1uch regard for the question of 
whether or not it was legal. A.nd it is just as logical to infer, 
from the facts, that enforcement officers have been lax in their 
duties as it is to infer that the legislature intended that the 
locker system should be lawful. 
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The n1ost serious objection to \vhich the doctrine of con-
temporaneous construction is open in the instant case is that 
this doctrine of statutory construction may not be used to vary 
the plain meaning of the statute. Bridge and Highway De-
partnlent v. Felt, 21-l Cal. 308, 5 Pac. (2d) 585. It should 
ahvays be rejected ,,·here it is unreasonable or clearly erroneous. 
Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Company, 285 U. S. 1, 16, 76 L.Ed. 
587, 52 S. Ct. 275. In the case of State ex. rel. University of 
Minnesota vs. Chase, 175 Minn. 259; 220 N.W. 951, the 
court used the following language in meeting the argument of 
contemporaneous construction: 
UThere is thus abundant ammunition for the argu-
ment of practical construction. But the case furnishes 
it no target. We cannot even adopt it as a buttress 
for a conclusion already reached, as is sometimes done. 
State ex rel. Hilton v. Sword, 157 Minn. 263, 265, 196 
N~W. 467. A practical construction of anything writ--
ten--constitution, statute, or contract-is but an aid 
to interpretation, not to be _resorted to unless such an 
aid is required. In a real but broad sense, it is true 
that (words always need interpretation; that the. process 
of interpretation inherently and inv-ariably means the 
ascertainment of the association between words and 
external objects; and that this makes inevitable a free 
resort to extrinsic matters for applying and enforcing 
the document. * * * All the circumstances must be 
considered which go to make clear the sense of the_ 
\vords.' 5 Wign1ore, Ev. (2 Ed.) sec. 2470(3). But 
when that sense is made or becomes plain, the process 
of interpretation ends. In construing a constitutional 
provision or any writing, first resort is to letter and 
spirit. That implies application of v.'riting to subject 
matter. If without going farther the meaning is plain, 
interpretation is at an end. Resort cannot then be had 
17 
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to the extr~neous to obs,ure what is already clear, and · 
so start again the process of construction and excuse 
resort to further extraneous aids. The extraneous or 
subsequent cannot be resorted to as a means of refuting 
what is inescapable fr9m the instrument itself in ap-
plication to its .subject. It is not then permissible to 
adopt any different practical construction of a con-
stitution ,hov1ever long continued or \vell established, 
or however distinguished its authorship. Hence, every 
authoritative statement of the doctri?e of practical 
construction makes it applicable only in a case of 
doubtful meaning. See for example, Springer v. 
Philippine Islands, ____ U. S. ____ , 48 S. Ct. 480, 72 L.ed. 
522, 527. The doctrine is allowed its 'fu11 legitimate 
force * ·* * to solve in its own favor the doubts which 
arise on reading the instrument to be construed.' 1 
Cooley,- Canst. Lim. ( 8 ed.) 151. It may illustrate 
or confirm, explain doubt or expound obscurity, but 
'it can never abrogate the text, it can never fritter away 
its obvious sense, it can never narrow down its true 
limitations, it can never enlarge its natural boundaries.' 
1 Story, Const. ( 5 ed.) sec. 407. 
· Where the controlling words have a definite mean-
ing and involve no absurdity or self-contradiction, 
'then that meaning apparent upon the face of the in-
strument is the one which alone we are at liberty to 
say \vas intended to be conveyed. In such a case there 
is no room for construction. * * * Neither courts 
nor legislatures have the right to add or to take a\vay 
from that meaning. * * * It must be very plain, nay, 
absolutely certain, that the people did not intend \vhat 
the language they have employed, in . its natural sig-
nification, imports, before a court will feel itself at 
liberty, to depart from t4e plain reading of a consti-
tutional provision.' State ex rel, Childs v. Sutton, 
63 Minn. 14.7, 150, 65 N.W. 262, 30 L.R.A. 630, 56 
A.S.R. 459, quoting frotn Ne,vell v. People, 7 N.Y. 
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9, 97. Compare State ex rei. Putnam v. Holn1, 172 
~linn. 162, 215 N.W. 200. Were the courts, sitnply 
because of its extended duration, obliged to follow 
an erroneous practical construction of a plain provision 
of it, a constitution could be amended without con- • 
suiting the people. Nothing is farther fron1 the basic 
theory of our governn1ent. t\Vhen the meaning and 
scope of a constitutional provision are clear, it cannot 
be overthro\\'n by legislative action, although several 
times repeated and never before challenged.' The 
delay in presenting the question is no excuse for not 
giving it full consideration and determining it in 
accordance \vith the true meaning of the constitution. 
Fairbank v. lT. S. 181 U. S. 283, 311, 21 S. Ct. 648, 
45 L.ed. 862. 
\Ve find it unnecessary to discuss the argument based 
upon the debates in the state constitutional convention. 
They show nothing opposed to our conclusions. They 
are but another aid to be resorted to only in case of 
doubt. To us, the language of art. 8, sec. 4, of the 
constitution of ~1innesota admits of no doubt.'' 
And even if the statute before us is open to interpretation, 
the doctrine of administrative or contemporaneous construction 
should not change the result. In 2 Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction ( 3rd ed.) Sec. 5104, it is said: 
"The conclusiveness of a contemporaneous and prac-
tical construction will depend upon a number of addi-
tional elements that give efficacy to the rule. In general, 
these elements are: ( 1) that the interpretation origi-
nated from a reliable source; ( 2) that the interpreta-
tion has continued for a long period of time and re-
ceived wide acceptance, and ( 3) that the interpretation 
\vas made at or near the time of the enacttnent of the 
statute." 
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We submit that not one of the elements listed above is present 
in the instant case. There is no showing that the construction 
has been "contemporaneous, long, uniform and practical." 
See People ex rel. DeBoer v. Geary, 323· Ill. App. 32, 54 
N.E. (2d) 840. 
In any event, -the court must weigh contemporaneous con-
struction against other extrinsic aids in the interpretation of 
the statute. Board v. Borgen, 192 Minn. 367, 256 N. W. 894; 
Jordt v. Board, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 591, 96 Pac. (2d) 809. 
We have shown that other maxims of statutory construction 
lead to the conclusion that defendants' conduct is unlawful 
under the provisions of 46-0-237 Utah Code Annota~ed 194_1. 
For the doctrine to apply it should appear that the con-
struction contended for has been called to the attention of the 
Legislature, and informal interpretations by administrative 
departments will be given little weight. Helvering v. N.Y. Trust 
Co., 292 U. S. 455, 78 L. ed. 1361, 54 S. Ct. 806. 
That enforcernent officers have been derelict in enforcing 
the provisions of a particular statute will not later estop the 
state from enforcing the act, and may be doubtful evidence 
of legislative intent. Ada County v. Boise Commercial Club, 
20 Idaho 421, 118 Pac. 1086; Commission ex rel. Huntsman 
v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Company, 143 Ky. 
314, 136 S.W. 1032; Louisville v. State Board of Education, 
154 Ky. 316, 157 S.W. 3·79. Even where non-action is taken 
to indicate a contemporal)eous construction it should appear 
that the non-action is a result of thoughtful interpretation 
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rather than accident. 2 Sutherland on Statutory Constr~ction 
(3rd ed.) 520. 
The above cases indicate that the court erred in finding 
the legis~ature did not intend to prohibit the type of conduct 
now being engaged in by the defendants. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Utah legislature adopted, \Vith tninor variations, a type 
of common nuisance section which had appeared often in 
statutes of other states. The interpretation placed upon such 
sections prior to its adoption in Utah was such as would make 
unlawful the operations and methods of the defendants. It 
is presumed that the legislature meant to adopt the section as 
interpreted. And this is even clearer v1hen it is noted that the 
section \vas materially amended in 193 7 to conform to earlier 
acts. 
The meaning of the statute thus being clear, the doctrine 
of contemporaneous construction has no application. But 
even if this doctrine may be used, it is under the circumstances 
such a weak indication of legislative intent that the interpre-
tation of the statute under other principles may not be altered. 
For the above reasons we believe the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed and this court should enter a declara-
tory judgment to the effect that the locker system as practiced 
by these defendants is within the prohibition of Section 46-0-23 7 
Litah Code Annotated 1943. 
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,: I 
·Because all issues are issues of law there is no necessity 
of remitting the case to the trial court for further actio~. 
·., 
· Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON,. 
Attorney General 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON, 
Deputy Attorney General 
MARK K. BOYLE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
BRYCE E .. ROE, 
Assistant Attorney Genet·al 
Atto1'neys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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